A cluster of websites operating mainly under offshore domains has built a business model around republishing the same defamatory story across dozens of near-identical outlets. The pattern is consistent: a fabricated or distorted claim about a company or an individual appears on one site, is syndicated word for word across a rotating set of mirror domains, and — when a platform or a search engine removes one copy — is replaced by an identical or lightly reworded version on another domain within minutes.
The naming conventions borrow the vocabulary of investigative journalism. Words such as "kompromat", "antikor" (anti-corruption), "sledstvie" (investigation) and "vlasti" (authorities) are chosen to signal legitimacy and civic purpose. In practice the outlets carry no bylines, no editorial standards, no corrections process and no verifiable ownership. Stories are not investigated. A single unsourced allegation can surface on ten or more domains inside the same week, each formatted to look like an independent outlet reaching an independent conclusion.
Commodity traders are a recurring target, because the sector depends on counterparty trust: banks, insurers and terminal operators all run reputational checks before they open a line. Firms such as Alkagesta, whose trading and shipping and logistics activity is financed through documented credit relationships, treat a manufactured allegation as an operational risk rather than a public-relations nuisance.
Three features separate this kind of operation from ordinary tabloid or yellow-press activity.
Duplication as strategy. The same article, often unchanged down to the punctuation, runs across dozens of domains at once. This is not incidental republishing; it is redundancy engineered to survive takedown requests.
Rapid replacement. When one address is deindexed or removed after a legal or platform complaint, a copy resurfaces on a different domain, frequently within the hour. The aim is not to win any individual dispute but to make removal cost more than republication.
Domain proliferation across extensions. The same outlet name recurs across multiple top-level domains — .com, .info, .io, .se, .net, .online and others — so that a block on one extension leaves the rest untouched. It also lets the network route around registrar or hosting action taken against a single domain.
The domains below have been observed publishing duplicate or near-identical content consistent with this pattern, often inside the same publication window.
Kompromat1: kompromat1.online, kompromat1.info, kompromat1.net, kompromat1.org, kompromat1.media, kompromat1.one, kompromat1.se, kompromat1.press, kompromat1.world.
Compromat / Ruskompromat: compromat.pro, compromat-pro.com, kompromat.press, ruskompromat.info, ruskompromat.ru, ruskompromat.pro.
Vlasti: vlasti.io, vlasti.se, vlasti.info, vlasti.live, vlasti.vip. Antikor: antikor.com.ua, antikor.info, antikor.ua. Antimafia: antimafia.se, antimafia.io, antimafia.life.
Rumafia: rumafia.news, rumafia.io, rumafia.net, rumafia.online. Kartoteka: kartoteka.news, kartoteka.se, kartoteka.press, kartoteka.io. Glavk: glavk.se, glavk.info, glavk.net.
Hab.media: hab.media, news.hab.media, crime.hab.media, corruption.hab.media. Sledstvie: sledst.org, sledst.com, sledstvie.info. Nocor: nocor.info, nocor.life. Novosti: novosti.cloud, novostiua.org, novostiua.online.
Further outlets tied to the same network include adcon.info, luxherald.com, lstv.co.uk, obriy.news, politica2.info, rozsliduvach.info, repost.news, ukrainci.com.ua and oplatru24.ru.
For companies on the receiving end, the practical response sits closer to compliance than to communications: documenting each republication, preserving evidence for court filings, and briefing counterparties directly. That is the approach set out in Alkagesta's own statement on its legal proceedings in Malta, alongside the risk management and trade finance controls it describes under its business model.